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NE WOULD hesitate to say that it is a cardinal principal of con-

stitutional law that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects only those who, however strong they are
financially, are numerically weak when heads are counted; that if plaintiff
is one of the many he not only must exhaust his remedies at the polls before resorting to the courts but must confine himself to those remedies.
One would rather believe that judicial review, if it is to exist at all, is
available whenever there is need of protecting people, whether few or
many, from those who, by election or otherwise, acquire control of the
coercive powers of the state. Yet, when set side by side, Sands v. Manistee
River Improvement Co., and Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota lend
* Assistant Professor of Law, Yale University.
123 U.S. 288 (1887). In a suit by the plaintiff to recover tolls fixed by state authority, the
defendant-consumer requested the trial court to instruct the jury "That the statute of the
State, under which the plaintiff was organized and the tolls were fixed, was in conflict with the
[due process] clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ....
in authorizing the Board of Control
to fix the rates of toll without notice to the parties interested, or affording them any opportunity of contesting the validity or propriety of such tolls, either in the first instance or afterwards." Instruction refused; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff affirmed by state supreme
court. On appeal, held: affirmed. Per Field, J.: "The whole subject is one of administrative
regulation, in which a certain amount of discretionary authority is necessarily confided to
officers entrusted with its execution. Should there be any gross injustice in the rate of tolls
fixed, it would not, in our system of government, remain long uncorrected." Compare Wichita
Railroad & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Com'n of Kansas, 260 U.S. 48 (1922) (contract-consumer is entitled to an explicit finding by the commission that its rates are unreasonably low
before they can be raised; so under the applicable Kansas statute [but on this Consolidated
Flour Mills Co. v. Kansas Gas & Electric Co., 1i9 Kan. 47, 237 Pac. 1037 (1925) is expressly
contra] and "general principles of constitutional government"); Attleboro Steam & Electric
Co. v. Narragansett Electric Lighting Co., 295 Fed. 895 (D.C. R.I. 1924). With these cases in
turn, compare Southern Oil Corp. v. Yale Natural Gas Co., 89 Okla. 121, 214 Pac. 131 (X923),

aff'd 266 U.S. 583 (1924) (contract-consumer not entitled to notice and hearing when rates are
abrogated).
2 134 U.S. 418 (i8go). Suit by the state to compel the railroad to conform to rates prescribed
by the state commission. The state courts refused to try the issue of the reasonableness of the
rates; the statute did not require a hearing by the commission. Held: reversed. "The question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for transportation by a railroad company, involving as it does the element of reasonableness both as regards the company and as regards the
public, is eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for its
determination."
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an aura of veracity to such a summary statement as the first of these.
And in an era when Chief justice Waite's pronouncement, "For protection
against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to
the courts," 3 is admittedly a once-upon-a-time story in its own context, its'
reiteration in almost identical words by the Alabama court in a cQnsumer's
suit 4 sounds a bit strange unless one attempts a reconciliation along that
line.
In fact, though one may not set it down as doctrine, there has been a
persistently different treatment by the courts of consumers who complain
that rates have been set unconstitutionally high from that accorded utilities whose complaint is that they are unconstitutionally low. Such a consumer's complaint was the one that the Alabama court faced in 1937; such
a complaint is the one that other courts as well have been confronted with
and have handled in the same way.5 The consequence of their decisions
is that "extortionate" has never risen to the dignity of "confiscatory."
It is not strange, of course, that the United States Supreme Court
veered away from Chief Justice Waite's dictum during the period in
which it did; if anything is strange it is that it took so long to do so. For
those cases in which the new extension of judicial review was born were
but a recapitulation, one may believe, of the development of twenty-five
years before in the municipal bond cases. One case that must not be forgotten is that in which the Court's reporter, doing his best to preserve the
amenities of his office, nevertheless thought it proper to suggest his own
explanation of why the Court followed earlier rather than later Wisconsin
decisions on which hinged the validity of such a bond issue:
And how far this departure from precedent [by the Wisconsin court] was owing to a
truer conception of the nature of general and particular laws, and how far to the fact,
that the judiciary of Wisconsin was a body elected by popular suffrage at short intervals, and which might have come to the bench suffused with the feelings and ideas and
wishes of a constituency wishing to disown an obligation which it had been found much
easier to contract than to pay, was a matter not seen perfectly alike by both sides. 6
As surely as Shays' Rebellion frightened the nether-Fathers of the Constitution out of any love or respect for democracy which they may have
3Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877).
4Birmingham v. Southern Bell Tel. &Tel. Co., 234 Ala. 526, 533, 176 So. 30I,.3o6 (1937).
5 St. Paul Book & Stationery Co. v. St. Paul Gaslight Co., i3o Minn. 71, i53 N.W. 262
(1915); Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York City, 50 lisc. 450, ioo N.Y. Supp. 570 (S.Ct.
i9o6), aff'd II5 App. Div. 69, zoo N.Y. Supp. 625 (iro6), aff'd i88 N.Y. 334, 8i N.E. i4i
(,907); United States Light &Heat Corp. v. Niagara Falls Gas &Electric Light Co., 47 F. (2d)
567 (C.C.A. 2d 193i). Cf. Atlanta v. Ickes, 308 U.S. 517 (1939), affirming 26 F. Supp. 6o6

(D.C. 1939).
6Havemeyer

v. Iowa County, 3 Wall. (U.S.)

294, 296

(1865).
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had, the restlessness of the Grangers confirmed the suspicions of some of
the hither-Fathers that all could not be well if there were no check on
7
popular government.
Nor, apart from any belief that the Court may have entertained as to
the efficacy of political action to protect the public at large, is it altogether
strange that the results in the consumer cases have gone the way they
have. It is undeniable that the courts, in this type of case, are faced with
difficult problems if they grant the relief the consumer asks. It may be,
of course, that the recent opinions of Mr. Justice Black8 and Mr. Justice
Frankfurter 9 foretell the wiping out of the distinction, at least on the substantive side, by a discontinuance of judicial review at the suit of a utility.
But in the meantime, unless one is willing, as Mr. Justice Stone recently
suggested must sometimes be the case, "to substitute a rule for a reason"" °
it is important to examine the articulate premises on which the result is
built. For unless one accepts a pure doctrine of expediency-an overlooking of the irreparable harm of the transient present for the ameliorative lesson at the polls of the future--as the foundation of constitutional
doctrine, it will not do, in our type of case, to say merely that the consumer" has adequate representation in the public officials and is bound by
7 To catch a glimpse of the temper of some of the members of the Court at the time, consult
Brewer, Protection to Private Property from Public Attack (1891); Swisher, Stephen J. Field,
particularly 314-15, 382-83 (193o); Miller, Socialism and Society (1889), reprinted in Gregory,
Samuel Freeman Miller 143-71 (1907).

8 Dissenting in McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U.S. 419, 423 (x938); concurring in
United Gas Public Service Co, v. Texas, 3o3 U.S. 123, 146 (1938).
9 Concurring in Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 122 (1939) ("The determination of utility rates-what may fairly be exacted from the public and what is adequate
to enlist enterprise-does not present questions of an essentially legal nature in the sense that
legal education and lawyers' learning afford peculiar competence for their adjustment .....
The only relevant function of law in dealing with this intersection of government and enterprise is to secure observance of those procedural safeguards in the exercise of legislative powers
which are the historic foundations of due process").
1oCurry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 367 (1939).
xxI use the term "consumer" throughout to denote either an individual consumer, a consumers' association, or a municipality representing its citizens. On the last, see McIntire,
Municipalities as Legal Representatives of Consumer Interests, 4 Legal Notes on Local Government 3 (1938). It need not be emphasized, of course, that in most cases the only "consumer" who will have the facilities for prosecuting an appeal of the kind here discussed is a municipality. Except for the largest industrial users, the expense to private persons is prohibitive.
And we are still not a sufficiently consumer-minded country to expect much to happen by way
of consumers' associations' appeals except, again, among commercial and industrial interests.
So far as municipalities go, there is no concern in this article with those multitudinous cases
arising out of disputes between cities and commissions over the latter's annulment of rates determined by franchise or contract.
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their acts." In the cases in which the doctrine is most frequently asserted,
namely, those in which a consumer is refused permission by the courts to
intervene in litigation between the utility and the rate-making body 3 or
in which he seeks to litigate the company's charges while another suit is
being carried on elsewhere between commission and utility,' 4 there is
probably little objection to such a teaching, though there may be to its
phrasing. Apart from other considerations that govern intervention and
comity between courts, it is fair in both of these types to presume that the
consumer is being fairly and vigorously represented. The application of
the doctrine to those cases in which, during or after litigation, the utility
12Birmingham v. Southern BellTel. & Tel. Co., 234 Ala. 526, 533, 176 So. 3o1,306-7 (1937);
United States Light & Heat Corp. v. Niagara Falls Gas & Electric Co., 47 F. (2d) 567, 570
(C.C.A. 2d 1931); cf. Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 592 (1926). With the cases
cited in note 17 infra, compare those holding that a consumer will not be heard to contest the
reasonableness of rates lower than the maximum allowed by public authority. St. Paul Book &
Stationery Co. v. St. Paul Gaslight Co., I3o Minn. 71, 77, 153 N.W. 262, 265 (1915); Brooklyn
Union Gas Co. v. New York City, 188 N.Y. 334, 8i N.E. 141 (T907); Underwood Lumber Co.
v. Pelican Boom Co., 76 Wis. 76, 45 N.W. I8 (18go) (semble); Homestead Co. v. Des Moines
Electric Co., 248 Fed. 439; 443 (C.C.A. 8th i918). See Griffith v. Vicksburg Water Works Co.,
88 Miss. 371, 386, 40 So. 1011, 1013, (i9o6) ("We decline to follow the decision in Griffin v.
Goldsboro Water Co. fI22 N.C. 206,30 S.E. 319 (x898)] in holding that while a water company,
which accepts an ordinance by which a maximum rate is fixed, is bound ....
yet such rates
are not binding upon consumers, who have a right to litigate against unreasonable charges").
Cf. Winsor Coal Co. v. Chicago &A.R. Co, 52 Fed. 716, 720 (C.C. Mo. 1892) ("In the absence
of any affirmative action by the commissioners, the intendment of law arising from the legal
presumption that public officers perform their duties should be that no complaint had arisen of
unjust charges, or that the commissioners ....
deemed the maximum fixed by the carrier and
the legislature to be reasonable and just").
x New York City v. Consolidated Gas Co,, 253 U.S. 219 (1920); New York City v. New
York Tel. Co., 261 U.S. 312 (1923); San Antonio Utilities League v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 86 F. (2d) 584 (C.C.A. 5 th 1936), cert. den. 301 U.S. 682 (1937). Cf. Chicago v. Chicago
Rapid Transit Co., 284 U.S. 577 (1931) (intervening city denied right to appeal after litigation
resulting in injunction against rate order was dropped by state officers). In In re Engelhard &
Sons Co., 231 U.S. 646 (r914), often cited as the leading case for this point, the lower court had
allowed the petitioner to intervene for himself but had denied him the privilege of representing
other consumers until he established their consent.
X4Spring Valley Waterworks v. San Francisco, 124 Fed. 574 (C.C. Cal. x9o3); Central of
Georgia R. Co. v. Railroad Com'n of Alabama, i61 Fed. 925, 981 (C.C. Ala. 19o8), rev'd on
other grounds 17o Fed. 225 (C.C.A. 5 th I909), cert. den. 214 U.S. 521 (i9og); San Francisco
Gas & Electric Co. v. San Francisco, 164 Fed. 884 (C.C. Cal. 19o8); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Star Publishing Co., 2 F. (2d) 15 (D.C. Wash. 1924). Cf. Schneider v. New Amsterdam Gas
Co., 1x6 App. Div. 345, 1o N.Y. Supp. 535 (i9o6); Pacific Tel. & Tel.. Co. v. Agnew, 5 F. (2d)
221 (C.C.A. 9th 1925); Griffith v. Vicksburg Water Works Co., 88 Miss. 371, 40 So. io1
(i9o6). Not all federal courts, however, have thought it necessary to protect their jurisdiction
by enjoining such independent suits in the state courts. See Consolidated Gas Co. v. Mayer,
146 Fed. io (C.C. N.Y. 19o6) and Richman v. Consolidated Gas Co., 186 N.Y. 209, 78 N.E.
871 (19c6), with which Buffalo Gas Co. v. Buffalo, 156 Fed. 370 (C.C. N.Y. 1907) should be
compared.
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and the public representatives agree to compose their differences'- is decidedly closer to the doubtful line. And it is far from self-evident-particularly in the case of those commissions which, some students believe,
have adopted or have been forced to adopt a "judicial" rather than an
aggressively pro-consumer attitude'6-in the sort of case with which we
are concerned that the rates, because they are made by public authority,
ought to be so binding on the consumer that he may not, by himself, bring
an independent suit.17 For here he is denying the adequacy of the representation and fighting against it. He is, in all likelihood, but one of many
consumers over whom the commission has jurisdiction. Since few of its
policies and fewer of its rate orders will hit him and his fellows at the same
time, it is difficult to say that, except in the long run, a concerted opinion
can be depended on to keep the commission in line. If, in this particular
litigation, the consumer has been represented at all, it is because the court
says that he has been, not because he has so chosen or acquiesced in the
choice.
To support the result, the courts that have reached it have adduced a
15 Wright v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 297 U.S. 537 (i936); O'Connell v. Pacific
Gas & Electric Co., ig F. (2d) 46o (C.C.A. 9th 1927).
16Bauer, Effective Regulation of Public Utilities 359 (1925); Dimock, British and American
Utilities: A Comparison, iUniv. Chi. L. Rev. 265, 271 ('934); Mosher and Crawford, Public
Utility Regulation 40 (1933) ("In the administration of their functions the most serious shortcomings of the commissions is the tendency to adopt a judicial attitude ..... If regulation is
to be made effective a changed attitude on the part of the typical commission is mandatory.
The original conception of the commission as an administrative agency must be reborn. ...");
Porter, State Administration 402 (1938). Mosher and Crawford, op. cit. supra, at 57,
describe the results of a survey made in 193o; interviewers in twenty-eight state capitals-they
talked with "prominent and representative editors (newspaper), writers, or university professors"-found that in seventeen states the local commission was regarded as "utility-minded," in six as "public-minded," in two as "judicially-minded," and in three as an unknown
quantity.
17It is, of course, true that some courts have held or intimated that publicly-prescribed
rates are not, ipso facto, binding on consumers. Griffin v. Goldsboro Water Co., 122 N.C. 2o6,
30 S.E. 319 (I898). See American Rio Grande Land & Irrigation Co. v. Karle, 237 S.W. 358,
36z (Tex. Civ. App. 1922), writ of error dismissed 240 S.W. xv (1922); Salt Lake City v. Utah
Light & Traction Co., 52 Utah 210, 228, 173 Pac. S556,
563 (I918); Wishkah Boom Co. v.
Greenwood Timber Co., 88 Wash. 568, 571, 579-80, 153 Pac. 367, 368, 371 (1915). Cf. Mount
Vernon v. New York Interurban Water Co., 115 App. Div. 658, 66o-6i, ioi N.Y. Supp. 232,
233-34 (i9o6); Wood v. New York Interurban Water Co., 157 App. Div. 407, 142 N.Y. Supp.
626 (x913). Occasionally such sentiments have found expression in the Supreme Court. See,
for instance, Mr. Justice Miller's concurring opinion in Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, at 459 (189o): "Neither the legislature nor ....commission ....
can
establish arbitrarily and without regard to justice and right a tariff of rates ....which is so
...exorbitant and extravagant as to be in utter disregard of the rights of the public for the
use of ....transportation [facilities] ..... " See, too, the similar hints in Washington ex rel.
Stimson Lumber Co. v. Kuykendall, 275 U.S. 207 (1927).
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variety of reasons. Many of them require little discussion. One can, for
instance, dismiss the Minnesota court's counsel of convenience--that if
each consumer were free to seek judicial redress against unconstitutionally
high rates there would be neither stability nor uniformity in the rate structure'---as summarily as that court dismissed some of its sisters' contentions that the utility's right to protection flows from its duty to serve 9
which has no counterpart in a consumer's duty to buy.0 To the former an
adequate answer is a simple non credo. To the latter the answer is not only
that given by the Minnesota court:
We are not strongly impressed with the proposition that, at the present time, the
inhabitants of our large cities can dispense with the utilities supplied by the public
service corporations, if the price seems too high. They are dependent upon these corporations for matters of daily need and comfort, such as light, water, power, and the
like. If these necessities may be obtained only upon the payment of exorbitant prices,
it really results in an enforced taking from the consumer of whatever he pays in excess
of a reasonable compensation-

but as well that, today at least, price regulation and duty to deal are not
coterminous.2 The price at which a milk dealer, for instance, may sell his
product and the price which he must pay for his raw materials are both regulated. In neither case is the dealer forbidden to select his customers or his
suppliers. Conversely, the Constitution, as it has been construed, does not
allow a state to confront every entrepreneur with a choice between whatX8St. Paul Book &Stationery Co. v. St. Paul Gaslight Co., 13o Minn. 71, 75-76, 153 N.W.
(1915).
19 Is this not an inversion of the common law's teaching that the duty to serve carried with
it, as a means of reinforcing it, the duty to serve at reasonable rates? Alinutt v. Inglis, 12
East 527 (K.B. i8io). See Kirkman v. Shawcross, 6 T.R. 14, 17 (K.B. 1794) (per Lord Kenyon, C. J.: "The case of the innkeepers does not bear any resemblance to the present; for as
they cannot refuse to receive guests, so neither can they impose unreasonable terms on them").
262, 264-65

20 Birmingham

v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 234 Ala. 526, 534, 176 So. 3o,

307-8

(1937); Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York City, 5o Misc. 450, 46r, 1oo N.Y. Supp. 570,

577 (S.Ct. x9o6); United States Light & Heat Corp. v. Niagara Falls Gas & Electric Light Co.,
47 F. (2d) 567, 570 (C.C.A. 2d 193r). See Pinney & Boyle Co. v. Los Angeles Gas & Electric
Co., 168 Cal. 12, 15, 4z Pac. 62o, 621 (1914) ("Moreover, while the public utility is bound to

render the service or furnish the commodity, an individual member of the public is not compelled to accept the service or use the commodity. If he does so it is conclusively held that his
act is an acceptance of the rate fixed and that he may not, thereafter, contest the reasonableness of the rate").
21St. Paul Book & Stationery Co. v. St. Paul Gaslight Co., 130 Minn. 71, 75, 153 N.W. 262,
264 (I915). See, also, Western Association of Short Line Railroads v. Railroad Com'n, 173
Cal. 802, 8o6, 162 Pac. 39r, 392 (1916): "Modern transportation has unquestionably reached

the point where it is no more an answer to the farmer who thinks that the rates of the auto
truck which passes his farm are extortionate, to say that he may haul his own product, than
it would be to make him the same answer if he were complaining of a railroad extortion."
2"German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 407 (194).
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ever rates it chooses to establish and going out of business or, to put it
otherwise, it has not been supposed that one who is under no duty to deal
may not protest against a legislative fixing of his prices.23

By the same token, it ought not to be difficult to convince a court that
is not merely looking for phrases to justify its conclusion that the argument that the consumer has no "property" at stake to be protected24 is
both untrue and irrelevant. It is untrue unless one closes one's eyes to the
millions of dollars that consumers-domestic, mercantile and manufacturing alike-have spent in electrifying their homes, their stores and their
factories, to the millions that they have sunk in gas-heating and watersupplying equipment, and to the millions irreparably put into sites that
would be worth nothing if it were not for transportation facilities. If this
be not property, this equipment which is good for nothing if the electricity,
the gas, the water and the transportation are not forthcoming, then very
little indeed can be called property. But the argument is as irrelevant as
it is untrue unless one ignores the tens of dozens of cases on the books protecting expectancies-call them "property" if you will-which are fully
as intangible as is this.
To deny that these arguments of the courts are convincing is not, however, to suggest that there are no difficulties to be hurdled. Beyond them
lie several which are harder to overcome. One that might be thought to
preclude, and certainly increases the difficulty of, judicial relief is familiar
enough. Grovey v. Townsend ,25 read in the light of Nixon v. Herndon' 6 and
Nixon v. Condon,27 is a warning that the Fourteenth Amendment has
limits, that a person who finds himself as effectively harmed by unofficial
action as he could be by official action may find no judicial relief available
against the former comparable to that which would lie against the latter.
But granting, for the sake of argument, that Grovey v. Townsend is good
law, its teaching must not be too hastily translated to cover our problem.
It is not clear that, in fact, a defense of no state action would be open in
such a case as the one we are supposing. Only rarely would it be clearly
open-only, that is, where the utility enjoys its monopoly without any
23Cf. Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928); Wil278 U.S. 235 (1929).
24 Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York City, 5o Misc. 45o, 100 N.Y. Supp. 570 (S. Ct.
i9o6), aff'd 115 App. Div. 69, ioo N.Y. Supp. 625 (x9o6), aff'd i88 N.Y. 334, 8 N.E. 141
(1907); United States Light & Heat Corp. v. Niagara Falls Gas & Electric Light Co., 47 F.
(2d) 567 (C.C.A. 2d i93i). Cf. Birmingham v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 234 Ala. 526,
533, 176 So. 301, 306 (x937) ("a subscriber who has no invested capital at stake, but only a desire for a lower rate").

liams v. Standard Oil Co.,

2' 205 U.S. 45 (I935)-

2' 273 U.S.

536

(1927).

27 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
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official grant or sanction and makes its charges at its own will with neither
permission nor denial by the state. In most cases, on the contrary, it
ought not to be hard to find enough state action to satisfy the requirements of the Amendment. One ought to be able to find state action in the
grant, as in many cases, of an exclusive franchise.2 8 One ought, too, in
most cases to be able to see state action in the statutory requirements that
rate schedules be filed and, as filed, adhered to. And if, as in many cases,
the rates are not merely filed but are actually prescribed, the requirements could certainly be thought to be fulfilled. The question is not so
much whether there is no state action or some state action as it is whether
what state action there is is enough to warrant bringing the Fourteenth
Amendment into play.
The issue is, in some ways, still more subtle than this. It is not true
that the Supreme Court never compels a state to act or to redress its nonaction. Many times, of course, the problem need not be put in this form.
Courts that possess adequate common law powers need not, ordinarily,
be asked to face it in this way. 29 They can, if they are state courts, act for
the state. They can, if they are federal courts, do the same in the absence
of state adjudications to the contrary. It is only when common law methods are absent-when, that is, neither common law nor statute gives a
remedy-that the issue must be met head on. Though it is so frightening
to think of its attempting to compel a legislature to act that it might be
impossible to induce the Court to do anything about it,3 the problem has
been thought simpler when the antagonist is a less formidable body. We
are used, of course, to federal control of state judicial procedure in the
name of due process of law. The indirect sanction of refusing to allow a
judgment given after improper procedure to stand is common enough. 31
If this sanction is not sufficient, the Court is armed, as Mr. Justice Johnson illuminatingly pointed out in his concurring opinion in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee,32 with the power to enter and to enforce against the
28 Common law judges have found enough in the grant even of a non-exclusive franchise or
of eminent domain powers to warrant placing the grantee under judicial price restrictions.
Allnutt v. Inglis, 12 East 527 (K.B. igio). Cf. Lumbard v. Stearns, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 6o (1849).
29 The illustrations are many, but of them Int'l News Service v. The Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215 (I918), with Holmes' concurring and Brandeis' dissenting opinions, is particularly
valuable.

30 The hesitation of the Court in Virginia v. West Virginia, 206 U.S. 290 (1907), 220 U.S. I
222 U.S. 17 (I9II), 231 U.S. 89 (1913), 234 U.S. 117 (1914), 238 U.S. 202 (1915), 24X

(igI),

U.S. 531 (I916), 246 U.S. 565 (1918), is notorious.
31 E.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (failure of state court to provide counsel for
accused).
32'

Wheat. (U.S.) 304, 362, 365-67,

381-82

(z8x6).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

parties a final judgment of its own.33 Beyond these cases are thosearising alike under the full faith and credit clause, 34 the due process or
equal protection clauses, 35 and federal statutes36-in which a state court,
holding that it was not endowed by its creator with jurisdiction over a
cause, has nevertheless been ordered to assume such jurisdiction by the
Supreme Court. Finally, there is such a case as CIO v. Hague in which
positive police protection was ordered, 37 or that whole line of cases following Gelpcke v. Dubuque3O which allowed federal courts to order tax assessments to pay judgments against municipalities.39 The point is, of course,
that the Court can and does make use of established instruments which
are accustomed to, or can be forced into, obedience to its mandate.
II
Constitutional difficulties of this sort need not, of course, be faced by
a court which is armed with statutory authorization to reverse a public
service commission. The constitutional question-just as it is, in any case
of this sort, a method for getting into some court without the aid of statute
-is, in such a case, hardly more than a means for getting into the Supreme
Court. The statutes come in various forms. With those that define with
some care who may appeal there has been little trouble; one who has been
a party before the commission has little difficulty getting into court under
them.4° More interesting are those instances in which the commission
33 43 Stat. 937 (X923), 28
253 (1872).

U.S.C.A.

§ 344(a) (1928). Tyler v. Magwire, 17 Wall. (U.S.)

34Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, L.O.O.M., 252 U.S. 411

(1920);

Broderick v. Rosner, 294

U.S. 629 (1935).

3sTruax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
36Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 55-59 (1912); Missouri ex rel.
Burnes Nat'l Bank v. Duncan, 265 U.S. 17 (1924); McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co., 292
U.S. 230 (1934).
37 The opinion of the trial court, 25 F. Supp. 127 (N.J. 1938), does not mention this important matter, but its decree is clear nevertheless; see The Hague Injunction Proceedings, 48
Yale L. J. 257, 268 (1938). The decree, after modification, was affirmed in 1o F. (2d) 774
(C.C.A. 3 d 1939) and 307 U.S. 4 (1939).
38i Wall. (U.S.) 175 (1863).
39The cases are legion, but Galena v. Amy, 5 Wall. (U.S.) 705 (i866), and United States v.
New Orleans, 98 U.S. 381 (r878) (with which compare Heine v. The Levee Com'rs, ig Wall.
(U.S.) 655 (i873)) are typical.
40 Allen v. Railroad Com'n, 179 Cal. 68, 175 Pac. 466 (igi8), cert. den. 249 U.S. 6oi (1919)
("any party to the action or proceeding [before the commission]"); Wichita v. Hussey, 126
Kan. 677, 271 Pac. 403 (1928) (inter alia "any body politic or municipal organization" may
complain to the commission and "Any ....public utility ....or other party in interest" may
appeal); In re Petition for Increase of Street Car Fares, 179 N.C. 151, ioi S.E. 61g (1919)
("any party affected"); Erie City v. Public Service Com'n, 278 Pa. 512, 123 Atl. 471 (1924)
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acts sua sponte, the applicant before the commission is the utility, or the
statute does not prescribe any qualifications for those who would protest
the commission's orders. The extremes in the range of possible decisions
under these circumstances are represented by the positions that have been
taken by the New Jersey and the Minnesota courts. The former, operating under a statute which makes no pretense of defining who may seek a
review of a commission's order, has permitted a person described simply as
"a resident, citizen, and owner of real estate in Jersey City, in which some
of the lines of the railway run" to contest an order increasing rates. 4' The
latter, operating under a statute which allows an appeal only to a party
to a proceeding before the commission, has denied the right of appeal to a
city which was notified by the commission of the pending proceedings, appeared on behalf of itself and of its citizens, took part in the proceedings
and cross-examined witnesses. 2 That neither conclusion is dictated by the
("any party to the proceedings affected thereby"); Public Utilities Com'n v. Providence Gas
Co., 42 R.I. z, Io4 Atl. 609 (igi8); Attleboro Steam & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Com'n,
46 R.I. 496, 129 Ad. 495 (1925), aff'd on interstate commerce issue 273 U.S. 77 (1927) ("any
complainant aggrieved by any order"; intervening complainants treated as complainants);
Railroad Com'n v. Houston Chamber of Commerce, 124 Tex. 375, 78 S.W. (2d) 591 (1935)
("any ....party at interest ....dissatisfied"; [for the chamber of commerce's position before the commission, see the latter's opinion and order, Sugar and Molasses, Carload, 37 Tex.
R.R. Com'n Ann. Rep. 447 (1928); for a follow-up of this case, see Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v.
American Sugar Refining Co. X30 S.W. (2d) 1o3o (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), dealing with the problems of collecting under- or over-charges for the period of litigation]); Eau Claire v. WisconsinMinnesota Light & Power Co., 178 Wis. 207, 189 N.W. 476 (1922) ("any person or corporation
in interest being dissatisfied"); McLean Lumber Co. v. United States, 237 Fed. 460 (D.C.
Tenn. x916) ("any party ....in interest to the proceeding before the Commission"); Anchor
Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 462, 478 (D.C. W.Va. 1928), rev'd because moot 279
U.S. 812 (1929); Saxton Coal Mining Co. v. Nat'l Bituminous Coal Com'n, 96 F. (2d) 517
(App. D.C. X938) ("any person aggrieved by an order issued ....in a proceeding to which
such person is a party"). Contra: Seaberg v. Raton Public Service Co., 36 N.M. 59, 8 P. (2d)
1oo (1932); In re Citizens of Belen and Valencia County, 37 N.M. 166, 20 P. (2d) 272 (1933).
These cases, of course, do not go to the question of who is entitled to make himself a party before the commission or who can be said to be aggrieved or affected. As to this, see such cases
as Public Utilities Com'n ex rel. O'Neil v. Marseilles Land & Water Power Co., 295 Ill. 522,
129 N.E. 113 (1920) (holder of completely or nearly expired equity of redemption in land served
by defendant not a proper complainant); Board of Railroad Com'rs v. Symns Grocer Co., 53
Kan. 207, 35 Pac. 217 (X894) (less than carload lot shipper cannot sue to enjoin enforcement of
revised carload rate alleged to be discriminatory); Steenerson v. Great Northern R. Co., 69
Minn. 353, 372, 72 N.W. 713, 714 (x897) ("complainant before the Commission need have no
direct or immediate interest in the matter, and even if [as here] he has, he is acting on behalf of
himself and the rest of the public"); Cleveland v. Public Utilities Com'n, 127 Ohio St. 432,
189 N.E. 5 (1934) (city not entitled to make itself a party to proceedings begun by commission
on its own motion and now finished which deal with "charges" and not with "rates").
41 O'Brien v. Board of Public Utility Com'rs, 92 NJ.L. 44, 1o5 At1. 132 (S.Ct. 1918),
aff'd without reference to this point 92 N.J.L. 587, io6 At. 414 (199).
42State v. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co., 146 Minn. 247, 178 N.W. 603 (1920).
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applicable statutes is indicated by results contrary to both in other jurisdictions. Thus the provisions of the Judicial Code governing review of
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission 43 are of the same indefinite sort as that involved in the New Jersey case. Yet the Supreme Court,
though it has agreed that one who contests an order of that commission on
the ground that it is ultra vires need not have been a party to the commission's proceedings,44 has denied that right to a non-party where the question is merely one of reasonableness of rates. 45 Per contra, the Rhode
Island and Wisconsin courts, operating under statutes similar to that involved in the Minnesota case, have allowed persons, who so far as the reports show, were in the same position as the appellant in that case, to contest commission orders. 46 This is not to say, of course, that the Minnesota
court could decently have construed its statute to reach the result that the
New Jersey court did if the New Jersey case had come before it. But it is
to say that both types of statute are resilient enough to allow some
thought to be given to what constitutes desirable procedure under them.
The result of the Minnesota decision is not only that unnecessary time,
money and energy have to be wasted in all cases in which the original complainant drops out but that, in reality, no consumer's appeal at all will
be available in those cases which the commission starts on its own motion.47 Whether one will wish to go as far as the New Jersey court has
4338

Stat.

219 (1913), 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 46

(7927).

Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. 557 (1gg) ("If plaintiff had sought relief against a rate or practice alleged to be unjust because unreasonably high or discriminatory
the remedy must have been sought primarily by proceedings before the Commission .....
But ....[plaintiff's] contention is that the Commission has exceeded its statutory powers.
....In such a case the courts have jurisdiction of suits to enjoin the enforcement of an order,
even if the plaintiff has not attempted to secure redress in a proceeding before the Commission."); see Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States, 263 U.S. 143, 147 (1923).
Cf. ICC v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U.S. 42 (1g1). But cf. Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies, 48 Yale L. 3. 98I (1939).
45 United States v. Merchants & Manufacturers Traffic Ass'n, 242 U.S. 178 (igi6) (denying
right to sue to one who was not a party before the commission); Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 476 (1935) (permitting suit by one who was a party before the
commission); see Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 281 U.S. 249, 255 (1930).
46 Public Utilities Com'n v. Providence Gas Co., 42 R.I. 1, xo4 Atl. 6og (ii8); Attleboro
44

Steam & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Com'n, 46 R.I. 496, 129 Atl.495 (1925); Eau Claire v.
Wisconsin-Minnesota Light & Power Co., 178 Wis. 207, i89 N.W. 476 (1922). The position
before the commission in the Rhode Island cases is sufficiently indicated in the opinions of the
court; for the Wisconsin case, see In re Application of the Wisconsin-Minnesota Light &
Power Co. for Authority to Revise Its Rates, 25 Wis. R.R. Com'n 88 (1920).
cf. Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 113 Kan. 217,
Pac. 797, 807 (1923): ".... the evidence disclosed ....that the investigation of
the contract rate was undertaken on the initiative of the Commission ..... As we read the
47 But

237, 214
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gone in allowing such appeals will depend largely on the situation in hand
at the time. There is no difficulty in saying that a petitioner who wishes
to present new evidence or to raise questions different from those which
were presented before the commission should not be allowed to do so in
court for the first time, that he should exhaust his administrative remedies before he comes there. 48 But if everything that can be said before
the commission has been said-if, that is, the appellant is willing to come
to court on the record made before the commission whether by itself or
by someone else-there is no good reason for requiring of him more than,
at most, a pro forma application for a hearing before the board. To demand that he start a completely fresh application and, on that application, bear the burden of proof that a complainant normally bears is to
ask far more than is necessary for the orderly administration of the law.
Some courts have found difficulties other than those centering around
the word "party" in the way of granting to consumers the relief that the
statutes would otherwise seem to authorize them to grant. Thus, in spite
of the statutory authority of the Commerce Court to "enjoin, set aside,
annul, or suspend, in whole or in part, any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission," 49 the Supreme Court threw an obstacle in the way
when, in Hooker v. Knapp,s0 it held, on the authority of Procter & Gamble
Co. v. United Statess' which was decided the same day, that the lower court
had no jurisdiction to review an order of the commission reducing rates
somewhat but not so fully as the consumer-plaintiffs desired. Though the
affirmative-negative order doctrine of the Procter& Gamble case has now
been happily discarded in Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 2 a problem
which that case raised still remains. Statutory permission to set aside a
Utilities Act, there is no order, permissive or mandatory, which the Commission is authorized
to make which cannot be challenged in a court of competent jurisdiction by any person ag" Sections 21 and 40 of the act (Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. [Corrick, 1923]
grieved thereby ....
§§ 66-118, 66-140), which were specifically referred to by the court, provide that "any ....
party in interest, being dissatisfied" may appeal and that the remedies given by the act shall
be merely cumulative of other existing remedies. In spite of the sua sponte aspect of the commission's action it appears from the report of the case (at page 222) that the plaintiffs were
notified of the proposed change and appeared in protest before the commission.
48 Compare the problem of review where no record has been made before the commission,
as, for example, where it merely allows a rate to be filed and to go into effect: West New York
v. Board of Public Utility Com'rs, 8 N.J. Misc. 93, 148 Ati. 6o3 (S. Ct. 193o); Birmingham Slag
Co. v. United States, ii F. Supp. 486 (Ala. 1935). Cf. Algoma Coal & Coke Co. v. United
States, ii F. Supp. 487 (Va. 1935).
49 36 Stat. 1148 (1911), 28 U.S.C.A.§ 41 (27) (1927).
So225 U.S. 302 (1912), reversing Hooker v. ICC, r88 Fed. 242 (Commerce Ct. 1g1).
S' 225 U.S. 282 (r912).

s2 307 U.S.

125 (1939).
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rate order at the instance of a consumer no more solves all of the consumer's problems by itself than would a constitutional doctrine of extortionate rates. In either case one must ask what a striking down of a commission's rate order means. Probably one must distinguish between two
cases. In the first of them the striking down of the order leaves standing a
prior rate schedule which is sufficiently low to satisfy the constitutional or
statutory requirements. There is, obviously, little difficulty for the court
in such a case. It is the second that raises trouble: the order being struck
down, there is left either a blank, or a still higher rate schedule, 3 or a rate
schedule which, though lower than the one struck down, is still too high
under the tests set up by the court.5 4 Within these cases, too, there are

possible distinctions that must be drawn. There will be instances in which
the utility will be willing to cooperate with the court-in which, to put it
differently, it wishes the lower rates that the consumer is asking for and is,
perhaps, merely using the consumer as a judicial cat's paw for its own
end.5 5 All that is needed in such a case is a decree forbidding the commission to enforce its earlier order. There will be instances, too, in which the
commission allowed the rates it did only under a misapprehension of what
was required of its' and in which it has both the means and the will to tide
over the interim. Again, the problems raised are not bothersome; a decree forbidding the utility to charge the filed rates and ordering the commission to proceed to correct its earlier findings is enough. It is only when
utility and commission are actively opposed to court and consumer that
one need fear trouble in framing and enforcing appropriate relief. There
s Cf. Public Service Gas Co. v. Board of Public Utility Com'rs, 84 N.J.L. 463, 87 Atl. 651
(S. Ct. 1913), rev'd as to refusal to review on certiorari and aff'd on merits sub nom. Passaic v.
Board of Public Utility Com'rs, 87 N.J.L. 705, 95 Atl. 127 (I915). Cf. Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. Railroad Com'n, i6 F. Supp. 884 (Cal. 1936), affirmed by an equally divided court 3oi
U.S. 669 (1937) (court may not refuse to enjoin enforcement of improperly adopted rate order
on ground that prior schedule which will come into effect is excessive).
S4For the converse case-where the court's injunction, at the suit of a utility, against the
enforcement of a commission rate order would have left in effect a still lower rate order-see
Public Service Railway Co. v. Board of Public Utility Com'rs of New Jersey, 276 Fed. 979 990
(D.C. N.J. 1921), appeal dismissed by stipulation 266 U.S. 636 (1924).
ss Such appears to have been the case in United States Light & Heat Corp. v. Niagara Falls
Gas & Electric Co., 47 F. (2d) 567 (C.C.A. 2d i93i); see the master's report to the district
court, 23 F. (2d) 719 (D.C. N.Y. 1927).
s6 Cf. New Orleans Real Estate Board vs. Ins. Com'n of Louisiana, 177 La. io9i, i5o So.
286 (1933); Brest v. Com'r of Ins., 270 Mass. 7, 169 N.E. 657 (i93o); Brand v. Safford, 118
Ohio St. 56, 16o N.E. 464 (1928). When, as in Allen v. Railroad Com'n, 179 Cal. 68, 175 Pac.
466 (i918), it is held that a supplier of services is not, contrary to the commission's determination, a public utility and, hence, that the commission cannot relieve it from contract rates
agreed to by it, there is, of course, no difficult administrative problem for the court. See also
Oklahoma City v. Corporation Com'n, 8o Okla. i94 95 Pac. 498 (1921).
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is, in such a case as this, the gentle method which several courts have suggested7 and that most courts, without considering the matter, use: the
court may, if it cares to, go on the assumption that the commission will do
its duty as it is instructed by the court, that it will say, as Secretary
Wallace said when his bona fides was challenged by plaintiffs who had
been successful in overturning one of his orders:
Whatever may have been my findings on the basis of the prior hearing, I see no reason why I cannot as fairly and as impartially conduct further proceedings consistent
with the opinion of the Supreme Court as any other inferior court whose action has
been reversed by an appellate court. I, naturally, thought that my original decision

was correct at the time. But I have never said or intended to say that upon a further
hearing with a new procedure or with the benefit of fresh argument or new evidence I
could not or would not change my findings. In view of the defect found in my previous
procedure and with the knowledge that my conduct of this proceeding will be most
carefully scrutinized, I have every reason to guard against any possible error of procedure or of judgment. My concern is not to vindicate my past judgment, but to see
that the substantive rights of the parties are fairly determined.s8

If, however, the commission cannot be relied upon to put a lower rate
system into effect expeditiously-and ordinarily the court will have to
give it considerable discretion in the matter-or, if, more than this, the
commission is so hostile that only a mandamus will force it to do its job,
there is indeed trouble to be faced, trouble that can be adequately met
only if the court has an "or modify" clause at its disposal9 or is willing to
S7E.g., Hooker v. ICC, 188 Fed. 242, 247 (Commerce Ct. x9ri): ".... . it appears that all

the shippers would gain in this litigation would be the vacation of the [commission's] order, and
if the court held that the rates permitted were so high as to be violative in a constitutional sense
of the rights of the shippers then no doubt the Commission would not again establish such a
high schedule of rates ..... At first we were inclined to think that the result which would be
obtained by a successful termination of this suit in behalf of the shippers would be so inconsequential as to render it unnecessary for this court to take jurisdiction over the case, but upon
further reflection it would seem that the shippers have the right to a judgment of this court as to
whether or not the schedule of rates ....is [tool ...

. high ..... Then if the shippers again

went before the Commission they would have the benefit of the judgment of this court upon
that subject." Compare McLean Lumber Co. v. United States, 237 Fed. 460, 468 (D.C. Tenn.
i9x6): "The petition is not open to the objection that it seeks to have the court take the place
of the Commission as a rate-making body, and require the Commission to order the railroad
company to establish in lieu of the new rates such other and lower rates as may be found to be
reasonable by the court. [It] ....
merely prays that the orders of the Commission, affirmatively requiring the carrier to establish the new rates and maintain the same for two years, be annulled and their enforcement enjoined .......
58Secretary of Agriculture v. Andrews, mimeographed opinion, 4 (Bureau of Animal Idustry, Docket No. 311, 1938).
59 See Van Buren Waterworks v. Van Buren, 152 Ark. 85, 89, 237 S.W. 696, 698 (1922). Cf.
Steenerson v. Great Northern R. Co., 69 Minn. 353, 376, 72 N.W. 713, 716 (x897), with which
compare Duluth v. Railroad & Warehouse Com'n, 167 Minn.3i, 317, 209 N.W. 10, 13 (1926).
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reseise itself of its common law predecessors' powers and to require the
utility directly not to charge unreasonable rates until the commission shall
6
have framed a new and satisfactory rate schedule. o
6oCf. Hutchinson v. Hutchinson Gas Co., 125 Kan. 346, 355-56, 264 Pac. 68, 73 (1928);
Consolidated Gas Co. v. Newton, 267 Fed. 231, 270, 273 (D.C. N.Y. 1920), modified and affirmed 258 U.S. 165 (1922), with which compare Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Com'n, 290 U.S. 264 (1933). Contra: Garson v. Steamboat Canal Co., 43 Nev. 298, 185
Pac. 8oi (1919); Railroad Com'n v. Uvalde Construction Co., 49 S.W. (2d) 1113 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932) ("When rates are suspended by injunction, the old rates which were supplanted by
those attacked thereby become effective ..... Whether or not such former rates are unreasonable ....becomes an entirely different controversy .... The entire matter ....reverts
back to the commission for relief .. ").
It is frequently said in the cases, of course, that rate-making for the future is "legislative"
and that, therefore, the courts can do no more than declare a legislatively-designated rate void.
This would seem to confuse the "properly legislative" with the "exclusively legislative." Compare three classes of cases: (i) Those in which the court has taken jurisdiction to determine
the reasonableness of rates charged by municipally-owned utilities exempt from commission
control: Kiefer v. Idaho Falls, 49 Idaho 458, 289 Pac. 81 (1930); Holton Creamery Co. v.
Brown, 137 Kan. 418, 20 P. (2d) 503 (1933) (with which, however, compare Holton Creamery
Co. v. Brown, 141 Kan. 830, 44 P. (2d) 262 (1935)); Butler v. Karb, o6 Ohio St. 472, 483, 117
N.E. 953, 956 (1917); Shirk v. Lancaster, 313 Pa. 158, 169 Atl. 557 (1933). See Oppenheim v.
Florence, 229 Ala. 50,57, 155 So. 859, 864 (1934); Springfield Gas & Electric Co. v. Springfield,
292 Ili. 236, 253, 126 N.E. 739, 746 (1920), aff'd 257 U.S. 66 (192X). (2) Those in which the
court, admitting that rate-making is a legislative function, has nevertheless held itself entitled,
where there was no commission control over a privately-owned utility, to enjoin discontinuance
of service when the defendant-utility, charged by law with the exaction of no more than a
"reasonable" rate, has threatened to exact an unreasonable one: Whitmore v. New York Interurban Water Co., 158 App. Div. 178, 142 N.Y. Supp. 1098 (1913); Mamaroneck v. New York
Interurban Water Co., 126 Misc. 382, 413, 212 N.Y. Supp. 639, 670 (S.Ct. 1925); Turtle Creek
Borough v. Pennsylvania Water Co., 243 Pa. 401, 9o Ati. 194 (1914) (with which compare Brymer v. Butler Water Co., 179 Pa. 231, 36 Atl. 249 (1897)); Ball v. Texarkana Water Corp., 127
S.W. io68 (Tex. Civ. App. 191o) (with which compare West v. Probst, 6 S.W. (2d) 96, io5
(Tex. Com'n App. 1923)). Cf. People ex rel.
Brush v. New York Suburban Water Co., 38 App.
Div. 413, 56 N.Y. Supp. 364 (i899) (mandamus to compel furnishing of water at reasonable
rates). (3)Those in which the court, as a condition of the granting of an injunction against the
rates set by a public service commission, has fixed the maximum rates chargeable by the utilityplaintiff pendente lite: Augusta-Aiken Railroad & Electric Corp. v. Railroad Com'n, 281 Fed.
977 (C.C.A. 4 th 1922); In re Arkansas Railroad Rates, 168 Fed. 720 (C.C. Ark. i909); Public
Service R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Com'rs of New Jersey, 276 Fed. 979 (D.C. NJ. 1921),
appeal dismissed by stipulation 266 U.S. 636 (1924); State ex rel. Cleveland v. Court of Appeals, 104 Ohio St. 96, 135 S.E. 377 (1922). Cf. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. San Francisco, 211
Fed. 202, 206 (D.C. Cal. 1913) (court will vacate injunction if unreasonably high rates are
charged).
The classic discussion of the power of the legislature to impose rate-making duties on a court
is that of Holmes, C. J., in Janvrin, Petitioner, 174 Mass. 514,55 N.E. 381 (i8gg). The discussion of McCurdy, The Power of a Public Utility to Fix Its Rates and Charges in the Absence of
Regulatory Legislation, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 202 (1924), goes largely to the problem of whether the
initiative lies with utility or court (and to that extent to the power of law as against that of
equity), not to the power of equity to enjoin if the prerequisites for equity jurisdiction are
otherwise present. Morrell v. Brooklyn Borough Gas Co., 113 Misc. 65, 184 N.Y. Supp. 651
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III
The question remains by what standards a court is to judge whether a
commission-made rate is so high that it ought to be struck down at the
suit of a consumer. Passing by the problems that arise when the subject of
the contest is an individual rate, the considerations involved can be seen
in those larger cases that center around the utility's rate structure as a
whole and that have been the main constitutional battleground in the
fights between utility and commission. It is on this question of standards,
one may venture to assert, that the possibility of getting a review on constitutional grounds breaks down. Probably the closest that one could
come toward achieving this end-aside from the purely imaginative possibility of the commission's fixing a rate so high as to be absurd, e.g., $io
per k.w.h. for electricity today-would be on demurrer. It is possible that
sufficiently strong adjectives-"extortionate," "exorbitant," or "oppressive," for instance---could be found to induce a court to do for the consumer what it does for the utility on a plea of "confiscatory." For there is
sometimes a magic in bare words that disappears when a more definite
formulation is called for. But that the magic of "confiscatory"--arising
as it does out of a persistent belief in property as a res rather than as a
congeries of relations-has led the courts into an attempt to find a formula
by which to settle the problem of the little more and the little less that is
so critically pervasive of this field of constitutional law, is hardly a reason
to hope that "oppressive" and its fellows which deal with intangibles will
(S. Ct. I920), 195 App. Div. 1, 185 N.Y. Supp. 883 (1921), 231 N.Y. 398, 132 N.E. 129 (1921),
which furnishes the starting point for his discussion, is not an altogether clear case. The New
York Court of Appeals answered the first question certified to it-"On the complaint and moving affidavits, had the court at Special Term power to grant the injunction pendentelite against
the defendant gas company, and to enjoin it from collecting the rate of $1.4o per thousand
cubic feet of gas?"-in the negative. (With this answer fell, of course, the affirmative portion
of the trial court's injunction which fixed the rate at $i.i5.) In doing so it did not refer to the
allegations of the complaint "that the rate of one dollar and forty cents fixed by the order of
the commission is unjust, unreasonable, excessive and exorbitant" but dealt solely with the
question whether the commission had any power to fix a rate above a legislatively-declared
maximum which had been held unconstitutional in another litigation. A sufficient answer may
be that the commission was not a party to the injunction proceedings and that, until it was
brought in, the company was entitled to rely on its filed and accepted rates. Another answer
maybe that, as pointed out by the dissenting justices in the Appellate Division (i95 App. Div.
I, 9 (1921)), the proper method of correcting the error, if the commission had power at all, was
by certiorari. Still another may be that counsel did not intend and the courts did not understand the allegation quoted above to be more than an inducement to equitable relief against the
alleged excess of power assumed by the commission. But it is not fmpossible to believe that the
Court of Appeals' opinion means that the trial court had no power at all to do what it did. If so,
the case is in conflict with others cited above.
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cause the courts to indulge in similar efforts. At least, as utility and consumer alike have discovered to their sorrow, 6' the effect of "confiscatory"
in tangibles has not been carried over to intangibles on the procedural side
of due process. Clearly, whatever may be the result in the statutory cases,
one could not expect the courts to hold, as a matter of constitutional
law, that the state's privilege is the exact measure of its duty, that the
lowest rate which it may set without the utility's being able to protest
successfully is the highest rate it may set without the consumer's being
able to do the same. And above this there is-again without regard to the
results in the statutory cases-no discernible stopping place that fits our
habits of thinking. Even granting, then, that other difficulties in the way
of relief to consumers can be successfully hurdled and granting, too, that
the Court, though less given to the exercise of power in the name of the
Constitution, might be presumed to be more indulgent to the consumer
than it formerly was, one must probably conclude that the difficulty of
finding a tenable formula renders the hope of effective constitutional review nil.
Except that they are not very explicit about the rates which the commissions are to set, the statutes may provide the needed leverage that the
Constitution does not. "Just and reasonable" is the phrase which is usually employed to describe these rates-a phrase which, like so many other
terms in the law, is one that has content only as content is given it. A
statute which goes beyond this will hardly move further than the almost
equally vague injunction that in fixing these "just and reasonable" rates
due consideration be given to the value of the utility's property. 6, Unless,
then, one is prepared to assert that there is such a thing as an "inherently
just" rate or a rate which is "reasonable per se" one must be prepared to
look elsewhere than to the statutes for help,
There is more than one verbally identifiable stopping place in the scale
of possible rates which a court might say marks the "reasonable" price.
Were one forbidden, as a consumer, to interest oneself in the earnings of
the utilities and to base one's claim of too high rates on those earningsas, indeed, some of the older cases held 63--one might be nearly stranded.
61 Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426 (1936); Lewistown v. Public Service Com'n, 8o Pa.
Super. 528 (1923); Scranton v. Public Service Com'n, 8o Pa. Super. 549 (I923). But cf. Huntington v. Public Service Com'n, 89 W. Va. 703, 7o6, iio S.E. 192, 193 (1921) (semble that judicial review for consumers is required by the Constitution).
62 Cf. Spurr, The State Commissions are Corrupting Utility Officials, 3 Pub. Util. Fort. 6i,

63

(1929).

63Canada S. R. Co. v. Int'l Bridge Co., 8 A.C.
(Commerce Ct. i9g1).
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(P.C. 1883); Hooker v. ICC, i88 Fed.
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But one might, under such circumstances, if one wished to indulge one's
love of the obscure, point to the "value of the service" as the proper
point.64 Or one could adopt some sort of quantum meruit technique and,
with all the difficulty that such a search implies, go looking for the prices
of similar services under similar conditions.6 s Similarly one could, as some
say the Massachusetts commission does, 66 set one's face primarily toward maintaining the utility's securities at par on the market and allow a
rate structure accordingly. Though one may doubt whether our public
utility statutes were drafted on the assumption that the American businessman is so incapable of looking out for himself that, unlike the economic man of the textbooks, he will not pursue the goal of maximizing his
profits without governmental pressure on him to do so, one might argue
that he is in fact so incapable, and so proceed to the conclusion, as
President Hadley and Professor Cabot do, 67 that the policy-favored rate is
one which will yield that result which would be had if the businessman
attempted to maximize profits, the assumption being that thus, and thus
only, can the utility's owners be induced continuously to improve and extend the service. Or one could, if this were too strong a dose, modify it
by saying that that is a reasonable rate which, allowing for the fallibility
of ownership and management, gives the utility enough but only enough
641 do not mean by this, of course, that "value of the service" cannot be made less obscure
than it is. For one such attempt, see Fisher, Value of the Service and Public Utility Rates:
Two Case Studies, ix J. of Land & Pub. Util. Econ. 76 (1935). I mean merely that, at present,
it has no well-defined meaning. See, on the subject in general, 2 Bonbright, The Valuation of
Property iro8 (1937); Edgerton, Value of the Service as a Factor in Rate Making, 32 Harv. L.
Rev. 5i6, 534-56 (igrg); Heyman, The Value of the Service: Its Various Meanings and Uses,
9 J.of Land & Pub. Util. Econ. 252 (1933); Spurr, The $S5oo House Telephone, 12 Pub. Util.
Fort. 320 (1933); Fisher, That $5oo House Telephone, 12 Pub. Util. Fort. 586 ('933).
6sCf. Turner v. The Connecticut Co., 91 Conn. 692, 699, zoi Atl. 89, 9r (I917) ("If a rate in
one locality is largely in excess of rates in other localities similarly situated and subject to like
conditions, it is an unreasonble rate, for this would instance a discrimination against one locality in favor of another, or other localities"). For a bona fide quantum meruit case adopting
this technique in part, see Continental Trust Co. v. United Railways & Electric Co., 7 F. Supp.
265 (Md. 1934). Both of these cases involve only individual rates.
66
Barnes, Public Utility Control in Massachusetts 152-56 (1930).
67Cabot, Public Utility Rate Regulation, 7 Harv. Bus. Rev. 257, 413 (1925); Ethics and
Politics, 142 Atlantic Monthly 686 (1928). Hadley, Principles and Methods of Rate Regulation, 16 Yale Rev. (n.s.) 416, 42 7-29 (1927); The Meaning of Valuation, x8 Am. Econ. Rev.
(Supp.) 173, 178 (1928); testimony in 2 Report of Commission on Revision of the [New York]
P. S. C. Law, 722, 735-36, 743-44, 747-48 (i93o). For criticisms of these two authors see Boatwright, Competition and Electric Rates, 7 J.of Land & Pub. Util. Econ. 181 (ig3i); Bonbright,
The Basis of Rate Control, in x Report of Commission, etc. ut supra, 334, 374-77; Gray, Competition as a Basis for Electric Light and Power Rates, 5 J. of Land & Pub. Util. Econ. 243
(1929); Ryan, Public Utility Rate Regulation, 8 Harv. Bus. Rev. 193 (ig3o); Spurr, op. cit.
supra note 62.
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to provide continuous encouragement for nobler and nobler work. 68 One
could, if one accepted the ethical "ought" that is caught up in the assertedly scientific "is," urge that, since the best of all possible worlds for distributing energies, resources and rewards is a competitive world, the utility should be permitted to earn what it would earn if such a regime were
present even though the utility is blessed, by grace or otherwise, with its
absence. 69 (Here, of course, one would be careful to define competition
so that it was a properly decorous competition, not the horrendous variety that occasionally crops up in the cases;70 the latter, if it were accepted
as a norm, might justify the commission in fixing rates closer to zero than
would be comfortable.) Or one could, if one thought this last were too
good or too bad for the utility, add to or subtract from it, as the case may
be, whatever extra costs or savings occur from the utility's being in a
monopoly position. Not finally, but lastly, one might (if only one had a
71
subsidy at hand) urge, following the analysis of Professor Montgomery,
that the rate should be so fixed as to evoke an expanding demand, the
limit of which would be at "the point where incremental cost and demand
price coincide" and that, absent such a subsidy, the closer one approaches
this goal without running into constitutional difficulties the better.
But the courts' answers, in practice, to the inquiries which such a phrase
as "just and reasonable" must raise are not so multiform as might be expected. The tendency is 72 to lay down much the same criteria that have
68Cf. Bussing, Public Utility Regulation and the So-Called Sliding Scale (passim) (1936).
69 This appears to be the view of at least some of the apologists for the reproduction cost

doctrine. Cf. Brown, Discussion of Bonbright's Railroad Valuation with Special Reference to
the O'Fallon Decision, i8 Am. Econ. Rev. (Supp.) i8 (1928); Railroad Valuation and Rate
Regulation, 33 J. Pol. Econ. 505 (1925); Dorety, The Function of Reproduction Cost in Public
Utility Valuation and Rate Making, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 173 (1923). Not an apologist for reproduction cost, Kirshman, The Principle of Competitive Cost in Public Utility Regulation, 35
Yale L. J. 8S (1926), also accepts competitive price as the norm ("Regulation of public utilities
in the United States has as its deepest purpose the perpetuation of ideals and standards attained in the field of natural competition").
70 Cf. Public Service Com'n v. Great Northern Utilities Co., 289 U.S. 130 (1933) (private
competition); Seymour v. Texas Electric Service Co., 66 F. (2d) 814 (C.C.A. 5 th i933), cert.
den. 290 U.S. 685 (1933) (municipal competition); Mapleton v. Iowa Public Service Co., 209
Iowa 400, 223 N.W. 476 (1929) (municipal competition); Great Northern Utilities Co. v.
Public Service Com'n, 88 Mont. i8o, 293 Pac. 294 (1930) (private competition); Community
Natural Gas Co. v. Natural Gas & Fuel Co., 34 S.W. (2d) 900 (Tex. Civ. App. 193o) (private
competition). See Gray, Public Utility Competition: A Case Study, IS J..of Land & Pub.
Util. Econ. z95 (i939).
71Government Ownership and Operation of Railroads, 2oi Annals Am. Acad. of Pol. & Soc.
Sci. 1137 (1939).
72 Wheeling v. Natural Gas Co. I,IW.
Va. r49, 175 S.E. 339 (1934), appeal dismissed by
agreement of parties 296 U.S. 659 (1935) (reversing commission for not considering original
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been adopted in those cases in which the courts have had to decide for
themselves in the first instance what such a rate is.73 And these, in turn,
run in much the same terms as those that survive from Smyth v. Ames74
The result is that, though there is some talk of reasonableness as a zone
rather than a line7s the zone, in most cases in which it emerges, will have

to arise out of tolerance in the application of formulae 76 rather than out of
a difference in the formulae themselves.
Off-hand it would, indeed, seem better to admit that the test of reasonableness is not the same when a consumer appeals as it is when the appellant is a utility. For it hardly follows that because the commission may
forbid a utility to earn more than, say, six per cent on a $5,ooo,ooo rate
base, it must do so-in other words, that anything above this is an uncost). See Public Utility Com'n ex rel. Springfield v. Springfield Gas &Electric Co., 291 Ill. 209,
222, 125 N.E. 89i, 897 (1919) (city's appeal from lower court injunction against commissionfixed rates); Eau Claire v. Wisconsin-Minnesota Light & Power Co., 178 Wis. 207, 216, 189
N.W. 476,480(I922) ("We believe .... that [under] the legislative command to the commission
.... the public has a right to complain of any rate which yields the utility more than a reasonable return. This is upon the theory that the legislature has in general terms prescribed but one
rate: i.e., a reasonable rate.... ."). Cf. Huntington v. Public Service Com'n, 89 W. Va. 703,
x1o S.E. 192 (1921) (commission's order raising water rates suspended on finding that it will
yield a return to the stockholders estimated at between nine and fourteen per cent though the
net return on fair value is but seven per cent). Consult such cases as State ex rel. St. Louis v.
Public Service Com'n, 341 Mo. 920, nLIo S.W. (2d) 749 (i937), appeal dismissed sub nom. Laclede Gas Light Co. v. Public Service Com'n of Missouri, 304 U.S. 398 (1938); East Ohio Gas
Co. v. Public Utility Com'n, 133 Ohio St. 212, 12 N.E. (2d) 765 (i938); and Chambersburg Gas
Co. v. Public Service Com'n, 1i6 Pa. Super. i96, 176 At. 794 (1935), in which there are appeals

by both utility and consumer.
73Pere Marquette Boom Co. v. Adams, 44 Mich. 403, 6 N.W. 857 (i88o) ("fair market
value, arrived at with all such aids [including cost] as the circumstances afford"); Long Branch
Com'n v. Tintern Manor Water Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 71, 62 At. 474 (Ch. igo5), aff'd 71 N.J. Eq.
790, 71 AtI. 1134 (1907) (fair value, but with emphasis on cost); New York Interurban Water
Co. v. Mt. Vernon, 11o Misc. 28I, i8o N.Y. Supp. 304 (S. Ct. 1920); Mamaroneck v. New York
Interurban Water Co., 126 Misc. 382, 398-401, 212 N.Y. Supp. 639, 656-59 (S. Ct. 1925);
Turtle Creek Borough v. Pennsylvania Water Co., 243 Pa. 401, 90 At. 194 (i914); Wishkah
Boom Co. v. Greenwood Timber Co., ioo Wash. 472, 171 Pac. 234 (i918) ("present fair cash

value, which is .... reproduction cost minus .... depreciation"). See Hall v. Tittabawassee
Boom Co., 51 Mich. 377, 399, i6 N.W. 770, 782 (1883) (trial court's instructions to jury: "fair
rental value of the property [for which "a reasonable expenditure" is permissible] used ....
in their business"); Underwood Lumber Co. v. Pelican Boom Co., 76 Wis. 76, 84, 45 N.W. i8,
21 (i8go) ("value of all property and rights of property necessarily devoted or used" in the
company's business).
74 169 U.S. 466, 546-47 (1898).
7s Detroit v. Michigan Railroad Com'n, 209 Mich. 395, 433-34, 177 N.W. 306, 319 (1920);
Portsmouth v. Public Utility Com'n, io8 Ohio St. 272, 14o N.E. 604 (1923). See Commons,

Legal Foundations of Capitalism 357 (1924).
76As, for instance, through the operation of the rules governing burden or quantum of
proof in the court.
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reasonably high rate. The only immediately apparent objection to the
double standard is that inquiry will be complicated and attention scattered by requiring the court to keep in mind two sets of criteria at once.
But beyond this, can anything be said for adopting the same criterion for
the consumer's appeal that exists in the utility-appellant case? The result makes sense as an expression of what generations of liberal economists
and exponents of progress have preached as the great end and justification
of private enterprise: as great a production of goods and services as possible. And this is not, one may argue, so far from the legal norms which are
associated with public utilities as might be supposed. It is but putting
into broader and more obviously ethical terms the rule from which the notion of reasonable rates got its common law start-the rule, that is, that
it is the duty of the utility to serve. That duty which in earlier times was a
duty to serve the occasional traveler on the highway, the casual applicant
at the inn-keeper's door, the passing customer of the ferryman can thus be
translated into the modern as the utility's duty to supply continuously
those indispensable services typified by water, transportation, power and
light on which whole communities are dependent. The utility's duty to
serve, read in this context, is a duty so to price its services that as large a
proportion of the community as possible shall have as full access to them
as possible. 77 And it is, so it may be argued, the commission's duty under
the statutes to see that this duty is enforced. It is its duty, to rephrase the
matter, to see that in the absence of unusual circumstances rates are kept
as low as the Constitution will allow them to be kept.75 To adopt such a
rule ought not to mean, of course, that there would be no flexibility in its
application. There would clearly be circumstances, for example, under
which the commission, seeing the impossibility of keeping the utility alive
if rates were pared as low as they might be, would be justified in not doing
so. There ought to be no difficulty again-if provision could be made
ahead of time for keeping such forced contributions out of the rate base-in permitting the utility to finance extensions out of present rates instead
of on the capital market. And there should be no trouble, for a third example, in seeing that the income over a period of four or six or eight years
77 Merrill, On the Distinction between a Nonconfiscatory Rate and a Just and Reasonable
Rate, 14 Corn. L. Q. 447, 456 (1929), arrives at the same conclusion.
78 An underlying assumption, which is believed justified, is that the return to which the utility is constitutionally entitled is quite enough to protect the community's needs in keeping it
going. See Merrill, op. cit. supra note 77; Lewis, "Reasonable" and "Barely Confiscatory"
Rates, i5 Com. L. Q. 573 (1930). Compare Guernsey, The Test of Reasonable Rates, 14 Va.
L. Rev. 1 (1927). Of course, if the constitutional bottom should drop out, it would be necessary
to re-examine this part of the problem.
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may be a better measure for deciding whether rates are reasonable or not
than is our more usual annual accounting period.
If this is the correct interpretation of the statutes, it seems clear enough
that judicial review at the instance of a consumer is proper in a rate case.
But "the correct" may be misleadingly simple. Can one say with complete assurance that there is no other "correct" interpretation?; that the
policy of the statutes is so clear that the commission itself has no choice of
policy to make? Probably it would be agreed that this is too broad a statement to stand. If so, it is not so clear that the consumer does have a judicial remedy open to him. For if we say that what is a "just and reasonable" rate is a matter of policy, we have practically committed ourselves
to commission finality. If, on the other hand, we choose to call it statutory interpretation, we have opened the way for the court to intervene.
The former result, in spite of the overturning of the affirmative-negative
order doctrine, is probably the one to be anticipated in the Supreme Court.
For we have been warned that
even when resort to courts can be had to review a Commission's order, the range of
issues open to review is narrow. Only questions affecting constitutional power, statutory authority and the basic prerequisites of proof can be raised. If these legal tests are
satisfied, the Commission's order becomes incontestable.79
Whether the state courts will ignore this as they have ignored the affirmative-negative order doctrine in the past is anyone's guess. Whether they
should ignore it-of course one assumes that there will be like treatment
of consumer and utility whichever way they go-is another question. Its
solution will depend in part on one's notions as to the propriety of an unsupervised and unlimited delegation of power in however small a field.A0
It will depend partly on one's estimate of the value of having some statutory method of judicial review at the instance of a consumer to counterbalance the utility's constitutional method and of being able to force the
courts occasionally to look at a commission in a light other than that shed
by utility-commission contests. And it will depend partly on one's estimate in a given jurisdiction and at a given time of the faithfulness of a
particular commission to its statutory duties. Of such must one's judgment be compounded.
79Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 139 (1939).

so So it might be argued, for instance, that because a statute which does not in terms or by
implication set a standard by which the commission is to fix rates (and thus give the courts a
standard by which to determine whether the commission has exceeded its authority) involves
an undue delegation of power-cf. Matter of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas Co., I22 App.
Div. 203, 214-15, 107 N.Y. Supp. 341, 349-50 (i9o7), rev'd on other grounds 191 N.Y. 123,
83 N.E. 693 (igoS)-the courts are required to determine whether that authority has in fact

been exceeded in order to avoid the standard's being rendered meaningless in practice.

